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The Changing Pattern in International Trade and Capital 
Flows of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries in 
Comparison with Other Oil-Exporting Countries 
 
 
 
Marga Peeters1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the past decade the GCC countries have achieved a remarkably high degree of trade 
and financial integration in the world economy. Before the global crisis began, they invested 
their abundant oil income which resulted from high energy prices and high world demand, in 
return abundantly abroad. Thanks to policies that are geared towards opening up borders, the 
GCC countries have imparted a significant stimulus to the world economy, to a much greater 
extent than other oil exporting countries in similar conditions. The development of the gross 
capital flows in view of the recent global crisis and their composition are the main focus of 
this study. It aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the pattern of the current and 
capital account of the balance of payments of the group of six GCC countries, and 
benchmarks this group with the other OPEC countries that have a comparable size of natural 
resources. Aspects of globalization, trade and financial integration, such as the dependence on 
oil, “Dutch disease”, regional integration, foreign direct investment and cross-border assets 
and loans are addressed. The impact of the crisis is found to have reverted international 
capital flows of the GCC, in particular cross-border bank loans and deposits.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Expert National Détaché, European Commission, DG Economics and Financial Affairs, Unit European 
Neighbourhood and Macro Financial Assitance, Brussels. E mail: Marga.Peeters@ec.europa.eu. The views 
presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission. The author 
thanks the participants in the workshop on The evolving international role of the GCC economies at the 
Mediterranean Research Meeting of the European University Institute. 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Gulf countries which together make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – namely 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - have up to the 
global crisis created abundant oil revenues due to positive price shocks and strong world 
demand. This holds in particular for the years 2007 and 2008. The current account of the GCC 
went up from 53 billion euro in 2000 to 177 billion euro in 2008 (see Graph 1). In 10 years 
time it recorded almost 1 trillion euro. A comparable group of countries is the other oil-
exporting countries of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which 
includes Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela2. Together with 
the Asian economies that have a comparative advantage at the world markets through cheap 
labour, these oil exporting countries mainly accounted for the current account surpluses in the 
world (see also OECD, 2010). In sharp contrast, other regions in the world among which the 
advanced economies such as the US and the EU, had deficits at their current accounts. In the 
discussion on global imbalances the oil exporters therefore play an important role. 
 
Graph 1  Development current account of oil exporters in comparison with rest of the world 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and own calculations.
Note: The countries in the world are subdivided in either advanced or emerging and 
developing. The GCC countries are part of the latter group.
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2 In this paper the group that will be used as a benchmark for the GCC countries will be referred to as "other" 
OPEC countries, as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar are also OPEC countries.  
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This holds in particular for the GCC countries. By comparison with the other OPEC 
economies that experienced somewhat similar conditions in terms of natural resources, the 
economies of the GCC countries are very open economies. Their high surpluses have led to 
abundant investments beyond their own borders, hence benefiting the global economy. 
 
According to the KOF index of globalisation (Graph 2), GCC countries score far more highly 
than the group of other OPEC countries. According to this measure, the GCC countries are 
more "globalised" than the average of all 158 countries worldwide included in the KOF 
analyses. The degree of economic, social and political globalization (split-up not shown here), 
has clearly been on the rise during this whole period under review, being 1995-2007.  
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Graph 2  Degree of globalisation
(Mean of indices of the individual countries)
Source: Konjunkturforschunsstelle (KOF) Index of Globalisation 2010, Zürich
 
 
Note: The index has three dimensions: economic globalisation, political globalisation and social globalisation. 
Economic globalisation is characterized by long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as 
information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. Political globalisation is characterized by a 
diffusion of government policies. Social globalization is expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images 
and people. According to Dreher (2007), there is econometric evidence for the period 1970-2000 for a sample of 
123 countries that globalization promotes growth, though not to an extent necessary to reduce poverty on a large 
scale.  
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Although the gap between the GCC countries and the average of all countries narrowed to 
some extent, the gap with the other OPEC countries actually widened - which is due more to 
the other OPEC countries (among which Venezuela) than to the GCC countries. In terms of 
long-distance flows of trade in goods, capital and services – which include foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, tourism income and transfers as percent of GDP - the GCC 
countries are therefore relatively highly integrated in the global economy. 
 
In terms of trade openness (see Table 1) the GCC almost achieved double the score of other 
country groups. While exports and imports of goods exceeded their total nominal GDP in 
2008, the other OPEC countries and the EU countries reached rates of 67% and 66% 
respectively. As higher foreign demand for goods by definition pushes up nominal GDP as 
nominal exports increase, ceteris paribus, the big difference between the GCC and the other 
OPEC countries is partly due to the level of the imports, which is far lower in the latter 
countries owing to their more autarkic and protectionist policies.  
 
Like trade openness, financial integration is a measure that reflects the degree of integration 
of a given country with other economies. As to the GCC, financial integration increased 
tremendously as domestic banks, companies and citizens started cross-border banking, both 
for business purposes and in order to invest in foreign capital or securities. In 2008 financial 
integration of the GCC more than tripled that of the other OPEC-countries (74% as against 
21%). 
 
Table 1  Summary statistics for 2008 
GCC Other oil-exporting countries1 European Union2
GDP (in EUR bn) 733 916 12,509
Population (in mn) 37 346 495
GDP per capita 19,798 2,647 25,270
Trade openness3 102 67 66³
Financial integration4 74 21 177
Crude oil production5 15 17
1The other OPEC-countries Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela.
2 Bulgaria and Romania not included.
3 Exports and imports as percentage of GDP.
4 Foreign bank assets and foreign bank liabilit ies as percentage of GDP.
5
 In million barrels per day.
Sources: IMF WEO Spring '10 and IFS, Bank for International Settlements Basel, OPEC and own calculations 
 5
Although the financial channels turned out to be source of contagion in the recent global 
crisis, they are nevertheless an important engine for economic growth. In this respect, 
financial integration - like trade integration - should be embraced, although caution is the 
watchword when it comes to the attendant vulnerabilities such as excessive debt, credit booms 
and foreign currency borrowing and lending. 
 
Globalisation and economic and financial integration have many dimensions. The next section 
shows the development of the GCC's balance of payments, which is divided into the current 
account and the capital account (including the financial account). It highlights the similarities 
among the two groups of countries of the current account developments, but also shows the 
big differences of the capital account developments. Section 3 continues with an analysis of 
the current account, looking in particular at exports of oil-related goods and the flows of 
remittances. Section 4 analyses the development of foreign direct investments, cross border 
loans and deposits and cross border portfolio investments, as these are pivotal for the capital 
account. Section 5 summarizes main findings, concludes and identifies some future research 
areas. 
 
2. NET CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
 
Although harmonization has not been fully achieved across all countries, the balance of 
payments tends to be split into a current account and a capital & financial account. Appendix 
A lists the definitions adhered to in this paper, where it is here relevant to mention that for 
convenience's sake all the financial and capital flows are comprised in the capital account. 
Therefore, the balance of payments is split into a current and capital account, where the 
current account includes the trade of goods, services and income, as well as current transfers.  
The capital flows include all other flows, such as foreign direct investment, capital transfers, 
portfolio investment and other investment.  
 
The current account of the GCC countries has grown strongly until 2007, even up to almost 
30% of GDP (see Graph 3a). A similar pattern, though of a smaller size, is observed for the 
other OPEC-countries (Graph 3b). The development of the GCC's and the other OPEC-
countries' capital accounts differ however much. 
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Graph 3a : Current and capital account GCC countries 
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Note: The current account balance as a percentage of GDP is calculated as the sum of the current account balances of the six 
GCC countries divided by the sum of the nominal GDP of the six GCC countries. Similarly, the capital account and balance 
of payments are calculated. Errors and omissions are included in balance of payments but not in he current and capital 
accounts; the sum of the current and capital accounts in addition to the errors and omissions equal the balance of payments.  
 
Graph 3b : Current and capital account other OPEC countries 
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Note: See note of Graph 3a. Iraq is not included due to lack of date at the beginning of this millennium. 
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Up until the start of the global crisis in 2007 the GCC the capital account had become the 
mirror image of its current account, indicating that the money flowing out of the GCC was 
about the same size as the money entering the GCC. In sharp contrast, the capital account 
balance was much smaller in the other OPEC-countries (as follows from a comparison of the 
brown bars in Graph 2a and 2b).  
 
The current account of the GCC countries has posted strong surpluses for many years in 
succession, as the positive trade balance more than compensates for the deficit in the balance 
of services and the outflow of remittance. The global crisis temporarily reduced imbalances 
across the world, including the oil-exporting countries, as commodity exporting countries 
faced falling exports, while developed economies - of which many are commodity importers - 
reduced their imports following a drop in their domestic demand. Although imbalances are 
expected to widen again in times where world demand picks-up, the GCC countries are likely 
to be on the high side of the imbalances in the world. Their strong export position offsets the 
deficits they incur on their services and the relatively high amounts of remittances that they 
pay for the large numbers of foreign workers who are employed in all sectors of their 
economies. See section 3 for in-depth information concerning the current account. 
 
Information about the capital account is in general more difficult to obtain than information 
on the current account and this holds in particular for these groups of countries. In comparison 
with the current account developments, the capital account consists of items that are more 
volatile, vulnerable and therefore difficult to measure accurately.  
 
According to our information here, obtained from various sources (see appendix C for the 
detailed information), the balance of this account for the GCC was negative from 2000 until 
2008 (as can be seen from Graph 2a). This by definition reflects a change in ownership of 
assets. The change in domestic ownership of foreign assets exceeded the foreign ownership of 
domestic assets. Consequently, net investments by the GCC abroad were higher than net 
investments by foreigners in the GCC. The balance of their foreign direct investment, 
portfolio investments and other investments such as bank loans & deposits was negative. A 
change in the pattern came in 2007, as repatriation of foreign funds by the GCC narrowed the 
capital account in relation to their current account. More details on the FDI and cross-border 
bank loans can be found in Section 4.  
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3. GROSS FLOWS OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
a) Fluctuations in the oil price affect nominal exports by 80% 
 
The main inflows of the current account for these groups of countries follow obviously from 
the exports of goods. Exports in both the GCC and the other OPEC countries closely follow 
the developments in the oil prices. The sharp fall in oil prices from more than €85 in June 
2008 to less than €30 in December 2008 was accompanied by a sharp drop in nominal exports 
of goods from oil exporting countries, with a short lag (see Graph 4a). Monthly exports fell by 
more than half, from €45 billion to just over €20 billion. This illustrates the strong 
dependence of exports on oil. Also, the resurgence of the oil price at the beginning of 2009 
led to a similar rebound in the exports.  
 
Graph 4a  Developments of the exports of goods in relation to the oil price 
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But much more relevant than the correlation between oil prices and nominal exports is the 
degree to which changes in oil prices cause changes in nominal exports. Using monthly data 
for the period from January 2000 to December 2009, it follows that a 10% change in oil prices 
leads to 2% change in nominal exports of the GCC directly for the GCC (Table 2 and Graph 
4b). For the other OPEC countries the short-term impact is even more than 3%. A shock of 
10% during a year leads at the end of the year to around 8% for both groups of countries (see 
Graph 4b). The oil price elasticities with respect to exports are thus high and, as follows from 
Table 2) highly significant.  
 
 
Graph 4b  Response of exports of goods to a 10% increase in oil prices 
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Note: The simulation results are based on the regression results presented below. They are calculated from a 
baseline scenario on the basis of the SUR-model as described in Table 2 and a scenario in which the oil price is 
10% higher in comparison with the baseline for 12 months in a row (see grey line in graph above).  
 
 
Table 2  SUR-regression results of exports of the GCC and the other OPEC countries 
 GCC other OPEC countries 
exportst-1 0.69** 0.61** 
oilt 0.24** 0.32** 
   
Adj-R2 0.94 0.92 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.18 2.08 
Note: These are regression estimates of the monthly growth rate of nominal exports on the monthly growth rate of nominal 
exports one month lagged, the growth rate of oil prices and monthly dummies, for the GCC countries (second column) and 
for the other OPEC countries (last column). Subscript t indicates the t-th month. A ** and * indicate significance at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is January 2000 – December 2009. The computing programme and data are 
available upon request. See also appendix B for similar regressions with leading indicators. 
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From similar calculations at country level for the GCC countries, it appears that Saudi Arabia 
is the country most affected by the oil price, followed by Qatar, the liquefied natural gas 
exporter and Kuwait, the oil-exporter. Bahrain and Oman are least affected by the oil price. 
Another noteworthy phenomenon is the increasing impact of oil on exports from the United 
Arab Emirates. 
 
Hampering the analyses, in general, of balance of payments data for the GCC is the delay in 
their publication. For trade data, however, the timely published GCC's trading partners data 
are good indicators. Appendix B addresses this issue.  
 
b) Remittances dropped 
 
High oil prices during the last decade fuelled the GCC’s region boom and, in return, forced 
local economies to look abroad to other countries for cheap labour. As the GCC economies 
employ many foreigners, the outflows of workers' remittances are high. The high level of the 
remittances is the reason that the balance of net factor income is deeply negative. In size, this 
deficit is however only a tiny share of the proceeds from the exports of goods, so that the 
current account of the GCC remains positive.      
 
 
Graph 5  Outflows and inflows of workers' remittances 
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Note: Outflows from Qatar and the UAE are not included due to lack of information. Inflows from Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar 
and the UAE are not included. 
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While there are many uncertainties around the precise amount of remittances, estimates 
indicate that Saudi Arabia transferred USD 20 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). For the 
GCC (with Qatar and the UAE not included) the annual outflow of remittances grew strongly 
in the period 2005-07 and stabilized in 2008 (Graph 5). It is estimated that the outflow in 
2009 fell 9% year-on-year. 
 
Remittances slowed down significantly during the global crisis due to slackening demand for 
labour following the onset of the global credit crisis. The higher cost of lending in the region 
led to a number of expensive industrial projects in the region to be delayed or cancelled in this 
year and, subsequently, forced many expatriates working in the GCC region to cut back on 
cash transfers to their spouses and family members.  
 
The much higher domestic population in the other OPEC countries makes that there is no 
shortage of labour, and there is thus hardly an outflow in the form of remittances.   
 
c) The composition of the current account of the GCC 
 
 
Graph 6  Composition of gross flows of the current account of the GCC 
-80
-40
0
40
80
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Sources: See appendix C.
% GDP
errors, omissions and others
inflow of remittances
outflow of remittances
imports of services
exports of services
imports of goods
exports of goods
 
 12
The composition of the current account during the last decade has been dominated by the 
exports of goods of more than 40% of GDP (see Graph 6). While the imports of goods 
approached this level of 40%, and gained in importance over the years up before the global 
crisis as did the imports of services, the outflow of remittances looks rather bleak.  
 
A substantial part of the current account remains unexplained, due to errors and omissions 
and other in- or outflows (such as transfers).  
 
 
4. GROSS FLOWS OF THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
 
d) The strong increase in inward and outward foreign direct investment 
 
Many oil exporting countries have a reasonable amount of inward Foreign Direct Investment 
that is invested among others in the energy sector for extraction purposes, but also in 
infrastructure projects. By comparison with other oil exporting countries, the GCC countries 
receive a considerable amount of inward FDI and, moreover, also invest a considerable 
amount of FDI abroad in relation to this inward FDI (see Graph 7). In 2007, GCC’s inward 
FDI peaked. In return, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
invested as much abroad as they received in the form of inward FDI. Apart from the GCC 
countries, Libya is also showing more openness, as the FDI it received accounted for of 6.5% 
of its GDP in 2007 and it invested 5.5% of its GDP abroad. Apart from Libya and the GCC 
countries, none of the oil-exporting countries spent more than 5% of their GDP on foreign 
investments. 
 
FDI is in general an investment involving a long-term relationship. The flows of FDI 
comprise equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra company loans. The large sums of 
money invested abroad by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait mainly come 
from their Sovereign Wealth Funds. At the end of 2008, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) possessed USD 501 dollar, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC) USD 328 billion, and the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA) USD 228 dollar (see UNCTAD, 2009).  
 
. 
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Graph 7  Inward & outward FDI of oil-exporting countries '07 
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Note: Included are the six GCC countries (in orange), the other OPEC countries (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Nigeria and Venezuela) but also Egypt, Norway, Kazakhstan, Russia and Syria. Source: UNCTAD, IMF WE0 and own 
calculations. 
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Up until the start of the turmoil on the global financial markets in 2007, the inflows of FDI 
had been steadily growing (see Graph 8). In 2007 – which was the best year - the GCC 
countries spent almost 6% of their GDP on FDI abroad, while 6% was also invested by 
foreigners in the GCC. This inward FDI has contributed significantly to domestic investment, 
and thus to economic growth in the GCC. Similarly, outward FDI has helped economic 
development, particularly in Northern Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia).  
 
While the GCC demonstrates its openness by the high level of the outward FDI flows, it 
receives - like the other OPEC countries - more FDI than it spends abroad and therefore posts 
a surplus on the part on net FDI on the capital account.3 In comparison with the other OPEC 
countries the GCC not only has higher outflows of FDI due to its policies geared toward 
global investments, but also received much more FDI in % of GDP in the years 2005-08. In 
this way, the GCC has reaped the benefits of its openness as this form of investment directly 
contributes to its economic development.   
 
Graph 8  Inflows and outflows of FDI 
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3 In view of the negative balance on the capital account in the period 2000-06 (see Graphs 3a and 3b) this FDI 
balance surplus by definition (see appendix A) implies that the other components of the capital account posted 
more out- than inflows, which points at the high portfolio and other investments abroad by the GCC in that 
period. 
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e) The surge and recent fall in cross border loans and deposits 
 
Along with the sharp rise in other cross border transactions until 2007, cross border banking 
also surged in the GCC. Deposits from citizens in the GCC at foreign banks grew 
significantly (see Graph 9, north-west). But, even more interesting, loans taken by GCC at 
foreign banks grew from 20% of GDP up to 36% of GDP in 2007 (Graph 9, north-east). The 
developments of cross-border deposits and cross-border loans show a clear turning point in 
2008.  
This follows directly from the changes in the cross border bank deposits and loans (Graphs 9, 
south-west and south-east), that count for the capital account of the balance of payments. In 
2008 the GCC withdrew deposits from its foreign bank accounts of around 3% of GDP while 
citizens of the GCC still took loans from foreign bank account of 27 billion euro. Some of the 
GCC countries became even indebted to the outside world. 
 
Graph 9 Cross border bank deposits and loans 
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Also the other OPEC countries reduced their deposits at foreign bank accounts, but not earlier 
than 2009. Their cross border level of loans in terms of their GDP hardly changed during the 
crisis, but this was already at a low level, in sharp contrast with the GCC countries. 
 
f) The composition of the capital account 
 
Although surrounded by uncertainties due to measurement errors and omissions, the picture 
of the composition of the capital account of the GCC is interesting (Graph 10). In recent years 
the account has been dominated by flows in cross border bank loans and deposits and 
portfolio investments. Despite from the fact that portfolio investments are hard to measure 
(and probably partly contained in the "errors, omissions and others component"), a conclusion 
that can be drawn here is that the composition of the GCC's capital account has drastically 
changed over the last years. Not only FDI inflows and outflows have become more important 
in recent years, but the other capital account investments have widened – capital inflows  
tripled and capital outflows probably doubled over the years 2004 until 2007.   
 
Graph 10  Composition of gross flows of the capital account of the GCC 
-40
-20
0
20
40
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Sources: See appendix C.
% GDP
errors, omissions and others
inflow portfolio investments
outflow portfolio investments
cross-border bank deposits
cross-border bank loans
inflow of FDI
outflow of FDI
 
 17
 
5. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE GCC 
 
Calculations of the current and capital flows for the GCC as a region should ideally be 
purified from intraregional flows. Although the previous analyses included the intraregional 
flows, the composition of the current and capital account is expected to change little if only 
extra-regional flows were considered.   
 
After all, the facts tell us that only 5% of the goods exported by one GCC country in 2008 
went to another GCC country. This applies to 9% of the total goods imported by the GCC 
countries. The facts also tell us that this intra trade of goods within the GCC has not increased 
during the last decade, as these export and import shares of the GCC countries remained at 4-
5% and 8-9% respectively. The interregional flows of services are expected to be even less in 
view of the similarity in economic structures of the GCC countries, while interregional flows 
of remittances in view of the relatively low population in relation to the economic activity and 
FDI flows seem negligible. Studies on interregional financial integration of portfolio types of 
investment show that flows are non-negligible and increasing but still relatively low (see 
Espinoza et al. and Balli et al., both 2009) 
 
By comparison with other regions in the world, therefore, there is a scope for the GCC region 
to increase this interregional cross-border trade, not least by means of a further diversification 
of economic activity. This will contribute to the functioning of this aspect of the common 
market among the GCC countries. This will require more complementary economic structures 
(particularly in agriculture, construction, transport, the financial sector and other services).  
Graph 11  Intra trade GCC countries in 2008 
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Source: IMF DoTS and own calculations. 
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6. SUMMARY 
 
As countries endowed with abundant natural resources, the GCC countries are fortunate to 
receive large streams of foreign money that, in the recent past, was spent proportionally more 
abroad than other countries with similar conditions. This high degree of trade and financial 
openness was conducive for the GCC economies and contributed also significantly to global 
economic growth.   
 
This study concentrates on the developments of trade and capital flows of the GCC in 
comparison with its peers during the past decade. It follows that, up until the start of the 
global financial turmoil at the end of 2007, the GCC countries received unprecedented high 
oil revenues thanks to soaring global commodity prices and high world demand. Not only the 
exports of oil and gas, but also the high inflows of foreign direct investment and access to 
international bank loans helped the GCC economies to develop their financial and real estate 
sectors, among others. The high inflows into the GCC countries in return also generated a 
surge in imports of goods and services, along with high outflows in the form of foreign direct 
investments worldwide (but particularly North Africa) and, last but not least, high portfolio 
investments. To a much greater extent than other oil-exporting countries, the GCC has 
therefore –- opened its borders and that is why it is now closely integrated in the world 
economy, not only economically but also financially. 
 
Thanks to GCC policies geared towards openness, the welfare levels of the GCC economies 
have been raised, but the GCC economies still remain vulnerable. Due to their high 
dependence on energy there is a risk that a negative oil price shock may impact the GCC 
economies severely. Further diversification of economic activity will be needed in order to 
mitigate the negative effects of a drop in oil revenues. Across the GCC countries, more 
diversified economic structures would also benefit the intra-GCC trade if the economies 
become more complementary. More trade within the GCC region will be conducive to 
economic growth. Where more diversified economic structures can be created, the further 
development of the economic union will help accelerate trade and economic growth in the 
region.  
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In successive years, the balance of payments of the GCC has been characterized by a strong 
current account, comprising a positive trade balance due to high oil exports, a negative 
balance in services and – prior to the global crisis – a net factor income account dominated by 
outflows in the form of remittances and inflows of dividends and profits on foreign 
investments. The balance of the capital account was often almost the mirror image of the 
current account during the period 2000-2007, implying that the abundant funds received were 
to a large extent invested in the global economy. Consequently, during those years the GCC 
decreased its ownership of foreign assets relative to foreign ownership in the GCC. These 
were abundant high levels of investments other than FDI investments in comparison with 
other oil-exporting countries. For the development of the world economy, this is highly 
relevant as these capital flows have been sources of income to other countries. The greater 
degree of openness of the GCC countries in comparison with other countries in similar 
situations in the past benefited the GCC economies but also the world economy.  
 
The year 2008 was a turning point in that the capital account started shrinking, because the 
GCC repatriated funds for its domestic needs. The GCC authorities and the private sector in 
the GCC countries opted for investment opportunities in their home countries instead of 
abroad. The GCC economies took less foreign bank loans while bank deposits abroad were 
withdrawn at the same time. In 2008 outward FDI fell significantly in comparison with 2007. 
These changes in investment policy raise the question to what extent these (apparently) more 
cautious GCC investment strategies impact their own economies, but in turn, also the world 
economy in comparison with the booming period before the global economic and financial 
crisis.  
 
The main aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the capital flows of the 
GCC economies. Although this aim was achieved to a great extent, the analyses were 
hampered, among others by the lack of statistical information on portfolio investment. Greater 
transparency in this respect, but also more timely statistical evidence of other balance of 
payments' items could help policy makers in understanding the capital flows that impact the 
global economy significantly. Also, more research on the trading or counter parts of the GCC 
could shed more light on missing elements and provide consistency checks (see appendix B 
providing an example for trade statistics).  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The balance of payments 
 
In this study the following definitions are adopted: 
 
The balance of payments = current account + capital account     (i) 
Current account = balance of trade   
                           + net factor income from abroad 
                           + net unilateral transfers from abroad     (ii) 
Capital account = foreign direct investment 
                          + portfolio investment 
                          + other investment        (iii) 
 
Following this definitions, it holds that:  
 
Current account = changes in net foreign assets      (iv) 
Capital account = change in foreign ownership of domestic assets                                       
                            - change in domestic ownership of foreign assets    (v) 
 
 
The current account reflects a nation’s net income while the capital account reflects a 
country’s net change in ownership of assets.  
A current account surplus increases a country's net foreign assets by the corresponding 
amount, and a current account deficit does the reverse. Both government and private 
payments are included in the calculation. The somehow misleading term “current” account 
originates from the fact that goods and services are generally consumed in the current period. 
Remittances are part of the net factor income where money earned by foreign workers that are 
sent abroad is typical income outflows. Foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are 
part of the capital account, but income from investments (interest, dividends) is recorded in 
the current account.  
Cross-border loans and deposits are treated in the section on the capital flows (see section 4). 
Their interest payments are recorded on the current account.    
The GCC countries have a positive current account if the surplus on the trade account of 
goods and services (abundant exports of goods) largely compensates the deficit of the net 
factor income account (outflow of remittances). The sign of the GCC’s capital account has 
changed during the last decade – which is a focal point in this study.    
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B. Analyzing the GCC exports & imports in the absence of timely data  
 
The analysis of the balance of payments for some of the oil-exporting countries is hampered 
by the lack of timely data for some of the countries or incompleteness. Among the many BoP 
components (exports and imports of goods, exports and imports of services, remittances, 
portfolio investments) this holds least for the FDI.   
 
As the exports and imports of goods is the biggest component on the balance of payments for 
the GCC, and most relevant for our (internal) analyses a leading indicator is constructed. The 
GCC’s main trading partners’ imports from the GCC are used to approximate the GCC’s total 
exports. Alike, the GCC’s main trading partners’ exports to the GCC are used to approximate 
the GCC’s total imports (for this methodology, see also Welzenis (2009)).   
 
A Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model with monthly data is used for explaining the 
annual growth rate of total nominal exports and imports of the GCC countries (Table B1). 
GCC’s exports are explained by the imports of the euro area and the United States from the 
GCC countries and the oil price. In a similar way, GCC’s imports are explained by the exports 
of the euro area and the US to the GCC. The estimated model is subsequently used for 
forecasting the GCC’s total exports and imports, by using the actual imports and exports from 
the eurozone and the US.  
 
Table B1  SUR-regression estimates for exports and imports of goods of the GCC 
 exports imports 
exportst-1 0.60**  
importst-1  0.64** 
oilt 0.14**  
imports euro area and US to the GCC 0.17**  
exports euro area and US to the GCC  0.30** 
   
Adj-R2 0.96 0.77 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.14 1.56 
 
Note: These are regression estimates of the monthly growth rate of nominal exports on the monthly growth rate of nominal 
exports one month lagged, the growth rate of oil prices, monthly dummies and an approximation of GCC exports, in casu the 
imports of the euro area and the US from the GCC (see second column). Similarly, nominal imports are regressed (see third 
column), using an approximation of GCC imports, in casu the exports of the euro area and the US to the GCC. Subscript t 
indicates the t-th month. A ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is January 
2000 – December 2009.  
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Graph B1  Leading indicator for GCC’s exports and imports of goods 
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Apart from the strong downturn in the beginning of 2009, the growth rate of imports of the 
eurozone and US from the GCC moves nicely in line with the growth rate of total exports of 
the GCC (see left Graph B1). The same holds for the indicator used for the  GCC's imports 
(see right in Graph B1). Also the econometric analyses points at the high significance of the 
indicators (Table B1). Using the statistical information from the main trading partners is 
therefore a reliable indicator. The simulated forecast for the trade balance (exports minus 
imports) is presented in Graph B2.  
 
Graph B2  Trade balance of the GCC 
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The time lag between the trading partners’ availability of statistics on the trade of goods and 
the IMF DoTs statistics for the GCC is two to three months. But for statistics on services, for 
instance, this lag is much longer. Given the high relevance of the components of the GCC’s 
BoP for macroeconomic and financial analyses, application of this methodology is part of 
future research.    
 
C. International trade and financial flows of the GCC  
 
This appendix lists the statistical information per country that was used in this study. The 
multitude of data sources and the definitional differences across countries make it hard to 
indicate in which situation which data source provides the most reliable and best information 
for the purpose of analysing the balance of payments. Therefore, and out of transparency 
reasons, I provide here the statistics that were used in the graphs and tables of this study after 
cross-checking in the available data sources and using common sense.  
 
The data sources consulted are the following: 
• Arab Monetary Fund 
• Bloomberg (national sources) 
• ECOWIN Reuters Economic Data 
• IMF Article IVs 
• IMF Directorate of Trade Statistics 
• IMF International Financial Statistics 
• IMF World Economic Outlook 
• Central Bank of Saudi Arabia, i.e. the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority Annual 
Reports, United Arab Emirates' Central Bank Annual Report 2008 and resources of 
other central banks.  
 
Main definitions adhered to are those used by the AMF (in casu consistent time series until 
2007), if and only if they are in agreement with ECOWIN Reuters national data.  
 
All data used and calculations made in this study are available upon request. 
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